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Abstract 
The boom of biofuel is placing enormous demands on existing cropping systems, with most 
crucial consequences in the agro-food sector. For instance, spurred by the increasing use of 
corn for ethanol, tortilla prices in Mexico suddenly tripled in early 2007. While the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Jean Ziegler is demanding an international 
five-year ban on producing biofuels to combat soaring food prices, the biofuel industry is 
responding with first initiatives of private governance and certification. The Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission among others have formulated criteria on 
“sustainable” biofuel production and processing. The German Environmental Minister plans 
to impose compulsory blending of only certified biofuel with petrol available at German 
stations in the near future. 
This paper explores the legitimacy of private governance and certification by biofuel industry, 
highlighting opportunities and challenges. There are three dominant lines of argumentation 
when it comes to legitimacy of private governance. (1) Most authors argue highly (or only) 
output-oriented (“de facto” legitimacy). In case of biofuel, this is problematic as long as no 
consensus has been established on what sustainable biofuel production is. (2) Deliberative 
democratic theories tell us that deficits of input-legitimacy can be balanced by the 
participation and inclusion of stakeholders (legitimacy through stakeholder inclusion). When 
analysing the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission, we find that 
both initiatives, in particular, fail to adequately include actors from the countries of 
production. (3) Finally, it is argued we need modalities for control and accountability in order 
to guarantee that the political output serves the common welfare (legitimacy through control 
and accountability). We will see that, again, the dominance of actors from the North is 
problematic because they cannot be held accountable by people in the South. Growing 
disaffection and lack of accountability are indicated by current hunger protests in the 
developing world. 
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Private Governance in the Biofuel Industry 
Introduction 
Biofuels are experiencing a tremendous boom these days, gaining support on the global 
energy market as a substitute for fossil energy. With oil prices over 100 US dollars per barrel, 
worries on the safety of nuclear energy and concerns about global warming boost the 
international demand for biofuel. Advancing knowledge and more efficient techniques make 
biofuel even more popular. Countries and producers see opportunities for new activities (see 
Geibler 2007; Lewandowski/Faaij 2006). Organisations such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations even consider bioenergy a key to the fight against 
hunger due to new investments and opportunities for agricultural development (FAO 2005). 
However, biofuels are anything but panacea. Replacing 5.75% of Europe’s fuels with biofuels 
by 2010, as Europe has pledged to do, or 15% of US gasoline use by 2017, as proposed by US 
President Bush, will place enormous demands on existing cropping systems. Vast amounts of 
land and water around the world are needed to produce crops that do not serve to nourish 
people but to keep US and EU transport systems running (Bringezu et al 2007; Hughes et al. 
2007; SIWI 2007). 
Since the Mexican “tortilla crisis” debates have become more intense (Geibler 2007, p. 5). 
Because of the energetic use of import maize, the price for maize meal increased and tortillas 
became suddenly three times more expensive in Mexico in early 2007. Beer prices in 
Germany ticked upwards partially due to the increased production of biofuels, and Italian 
pasta has become more expensive (SPIEGEL ONLINE 2007). Thus global competition of 
biofuel with food production has become obvious. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food Jean Ziegler is demanding an international five-year ban on producing 
biofuels to combat soaring food prices (Ziegler 2008, p. 22). 
Other organisations such as the Rainforest Action Network or Organic Consumer Association 
criticise the rapid expansion of industrial agriculture that uses of agro-chemical and 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). They blame the biofuel industry for repelling local 
communities and contributing to ecological destruction, deforestation and loss of biodiversity. 
The survival of orangutans, in particular, and other rainforest wildlife is seriously endangered 
by agricultural land development (UNEP 2007). Biofuel is booming despite such accusations. 
The biofuel industry and financial institutions in support of biofuel, however, respond to these 
demands with proposals for private governance. Among the most advanced initiatives are the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission (Geibler 2007, p. 5). While 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil goes back to an informal meeting initiated by the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) with some multinational corporations, the Cramer 
Commission was launched by Jacqueline Cramer, the Dutch Environmental Minister. 
The aim of this article is to analyse their legitimacy, and highlight opportunities and 
challenges of private governance in the biofuel industry. The initiatives are based on a very 
pragmatic, output-oriented understanding of legitimacy: negative effects of biofuel production 
should be avoided. As no consensus has been established on sustainability criteria for biofuel 
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production yet, this source of legitimacy is however more than questionable. Moreover, in 
particular, the RSPO faces major criticism from civil society, and both initiatives lack 
participation of actors from the South. 
 
1. Private Governance: Between Effectiveness and Legitimacy 
Debates on global governance and new steering concepts are based on the assumption that, in 
a globalised world, conventional regulation by the nation-state faces new constraints. Many 
problems such as the negative effects of biofuel production and associated processes are not 
solvable by unilateralist action. Cause-and-effect chains are highly complex, and controversial 
interdependences exist. Therefore, the regulative arena has been opened to “new” non-state 
actors and their capacities in terms of financial capital and knowledge (Rosenau 1992; 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003). 
Concerning biofuel, state activities such as US and EU subsidies are causing problems to a 
large extent. Without subsidies biofuel production would not yet be lucrative. Negative 
impacts are more visible abroad than domestically. For instance, oil palm can only be 
cultivated in tropical areas of Asia, Africa and South America. Domestic regulation in 
producing countries is missing or failing to prevent negative impacts, such as deforestation 
and soaring food prices. In the long run, the whole world will be affected by these failures; in 
particular, loss of rainforest implies decline of carbon sinks and enhances global warming. 
Intergovernmental approaches have been failing so far, and a world government which could 
take care of these issues is missing. At the same time, civil society organisations reveal a 
basic demand for regulative action, and private governance initiatives have stepped into this 
regulative gap. The necessity of solving certain problems is considered more important than 
the process leading there (Witte/Reinicke 2005; Messner/Nuscheler 2003). While focussing 
on effectiveness (e.g. avoiding negative effects of biofuel production), aspects of legitimacy 
have been blanked out by many or not considered relevant (Rechkemmer/Schmidt 2006, p. 
67-68). Legitimacy is however not simply transferable from state to non-state actors. Still, 
only state actors have the authority to prescribe behaviour of others. Private governance, i.e. 
non-state actors prescribing behaviour (e.g. how to produce biofuel), therefore demands new 
sources of legitimacy which will be discussed in the following.  
 
1.2. Legitimacy Bearings of Private Governance 
Legitimacy deals with normative aspects of how to reason authority, who or what gives 
authority and why authority is accepted by someone or not (Beisheim 2004, p. 327; Cutler 
2002, p. 27; Scharpf 1999). Legitimacy can be defined as “a shared expectation among actors 
in an arrangement of asymmetric power such that the actions of those who rule are accepted 
voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are convinced that the actions of the 
former conform to pre-established norms. Put simply, legitimacy converts power into 
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authority – Macht into Herrschaft – and, thereby, establishes simultaneously an obligation to 
obey and a right to rule (Schmitter 2001, p. 2)”. 
According to democratic conceptions, those who obey are those who rule. Rousseau speaks of 
the authority of the people for the people – “par le people pour le people”. Analytically, 
Scharpf (1999, p. 16, among others) distinguishes between the authority of the people, the 
output-oriented perspective of legitimacy, and the authority for the people, the input-oriented 
perspective of legitimacy. The output-legitimacy accords to the effectiveness of political 
measures. Legitimacy is thus composed by a fair process, today based on fundamental 
democratic norms (input legitimacy), and an effective and equitable performance delivery 
(output legitimacy) (Brozus at al. 2003, p. 27; Scharpf 1999, p. 16; Scharpf 2000, p. 349). 
According to liberal theory, only state actors are authorised to prescribe behaviour to others 
because only they can be held accountable through the political institutions – in democratic 
systems this holds true for elected representatives. The transfer of national competencies to an 
international, intergovernmental organisation ignited a debate on the legitimacy beyond the 
nation-state (Scharpf 1999; Steffek 2003, p. 252; Zürn 1998). 
Non-state actors are not foreseen by state-centred concepts of international relations which 
only know sovereign territorial nation-states and their representatives (Messner/Nuscheler 
2003; Willets 2006). Non-state actors are automatically regarded as illegitimate from this 
view point (per definition). When asking for criteria of non-state actors’ legitimacy, we thus 
dissociate from classic understandings of international relations solely understood as inter-
state relations. Private governance is a (new) mode of steering transnational processes that 
reflects a new relation between state, market and society which cannot strictly be seen as 
separated spheres, anymore. The same is true for the dichotomy between internal and external 
politics which appreciably overlap (Keohane/Nye 2003, p. 398; Strange 1996, p. 44). For 
instance, EU and US “internal” subsidies for biofuels have major impacts abroad (soaring 
food prices, rainforest clearing etc.). 
Private governance is mostly understood to be legitimate because of the output 
(Witte/Reinicke 2005; Rechkemmer/Schmidt 2006, p. 67-68), in the current context for 
example, the achievement of ending rainforest clearance for palm oil production. According 
to this pragmatic, output-oriented understanding of legitimacy, political decisions are 
legitimate if and because they effectively support the common welfare. Consensus is assumed 
on what needs to be done in order to solve a commonly perceived problem (Dobner 2007). 
Legitimacy is derived from the fact that these problems necessitate a collective solution, i.e. 
they can neither be solved by a single nation-state or within an intergovernmental setting nor 
by the market or volunteer actions of civil society alone. As this may be the case (for biofuel, 
for instance), private forms of governance beyond the nation-state integrating non-state actors 
are argued to be justified and “de facto” legitimated by their output (Keohane/Nye 2003, p. 
386; Majone 1999, p. 3, 22; Scharpf 1999, p. 16). 
In democratic theory, legitimacy being derived from the output alone needs to be considered 
with scepticism. Scharpf (2000, p. 349) denotes non-majoritarian legitimacy concepts such as 
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technical expertise or juridical authority as “indirect” or “weak” form of legitimacy. Steffek 
(2003, p. 257) warns that political results are only accepted if they follow certain objectives 
and principles generally acquired. Material compensations can help to guarantee acceptance 
but they do not inherit the prestige of considered binding (see also Haufler 2003, p. 252). 
Deliberative democratic theories tell us that deficits of input-legitimacy can, be balanced by 
the participation and inclusion of affected groups, the so called stakeholders (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002, p. 441; Habermas 1998; Nanz/Steffek 2005). Participation in this sense is 
essential to “good governance” (e.g. European Commission 2001). The involvement of 
affected target groups replaces to a certain extent the elected representatives in the process of 
decision making. This form of legitimacy though participation is described with the term of 
“throughput-legitimacy” (Dingwert 2004, p. 86). Throughput-legitimacy is part of the input-
legitimacy, following Scharpf, in as far as the process leading to a political result (output) 
refers to sources of legitimacy “par le people” (input). Therefore, in a way, this legitimacy 
replaces legitimacy through classic decisions by majority (Nanz/Steffek 2005, p. 80; Pattberg 
2004, p. 160). 
The question of which groups are “affected” in a particular policy field, i.e. how stakeholder 
categories are defined and how specific stakeholders are chosen for participation, is the 
central challenge for legitimacy through participation or stakeholder inclusion. There is no 
guarantee for representative stakeholder participation. For instance, in private food 
governance, we observe a clear asymmetry between participation of retail companies and the 
rest of the product chain, between North and South, and between representatives of business 
and of civil society interests (Fuchs 2006, p. 7). While state representatives in a democratic 
setting are the result of general elections, the stakeholder representatives from the private 
sector and civil society are nominated or offer their participation in private governance 
through vastly more informal structures (Brozus et al. 2003, p. 34; Hirsch 2001, p. 21; 
Kahler/Lake 2003, p. 427). 
The shift from input-legitimacy “par le people” to throughput-legitimacy by stakeholders also 
changes mechanisms of accountability. According to a democratic understanding, all power 
emanates from the people. Rousseau (1998 according to 1757, p. 62) defines the nation or the 
people as sovereign which appoints the government. The government is thus accountable to 
the people. The latter exerts political control over the ruling authority by electing the 
parliament and the government. On this note, the government is the agent and the people are 
the principal. Political accountability can thus be defined as the central back coupling between 
those who rule (agents) and those who are ruled (principles) (Kahler/Lake 2003, p. 10; 
Keohane/Nye 2003, p. 389). 
New throughput-legitimated private governance initiatives do not underlie any democratic 
control, because stakeholders are not appointed by the sovereign. The stakeholders are not 
elected but usually selected by the executive authority. Therefore, they suffer from a deficit of 
input-legitimacy following the understanding of Rousseau and Scharpf respectively. We 
hence need to find new adequate mechanisms of (legitimacy through) control and 
accountability for new steering governance modes incorporating non-state actors (Cutler 
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2002, p. 32; Keohane/Nye 2003, p. 388; Majone 1999, p. 9). When analysing private 
governance initiatives, we should ask for mechanisms of control and accountability which can 
improve their legitimacy. In the following, criteria for evaluating will be acuminated. 
 
1.2. How to evaluate legitimacy of private governance 
Private governance reflects a fundamental shift from an input- towards an enhanced output-
oriented understanding of legitimacy (Majone 1999; Witte/Reinicke 2005). Initiatives such as 
the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission aim to contribute to 
solving specific problems, such as ending rainforest clearing. The fact that certain problems 
get solved is considered more important than the modalities how this happens, e.g. if by state 
or non-state actors, if by public or private means (Rechkemmer/Schmidt 2006, p. 67-68). An 
informed consensus is assumed on the “solution” or result (Dobner 2007). This line of 
argumentation can be described as “de facto”-legitimacy. 
In the literature on new forms of (global) governance, two other lines of argumentation can be 
identified: legitimacy through stakeholder inclusion (throughput-legitimacy) and through 
control and accountability. Legitimacy through stakeholder inclusion refers to the process 
(input) generating a political decision (output). While de facto-legitimacy assumes a “neutral” 
or commonly agreed “best” solution, those who argue for stakeholder inclusion assume that 
an output varies always depending on those participating in the decision-making process 
(Habermas 1998; Nanz/Steffek 2005; Steffek 2003). 
Those who argue for legitimacy through control and accountability do not deny this fact. 
However, they turn to the output and modalities for control and accountability in order to 
guarantee that the political output serves the common welfare, including the possibility to 
retake decisions (Cutler 2002; Keohane/Nye 2003). Elsewhere I derived these three 
conditions for the legitimacy of private governance circumstantially and broke them down to 
analytical questions (Partzsch 2007, p. 101-105). In the following, I use this framework to 
examine the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission. The fact of 
one or all of these conditions being fulfilled (or not) does not necessarily generate legitimacy. 
In practice, actions of those who rule must be accepted voluntarily by those who are ruled, as 
defined above. Accordingly, this set of conditions can only serve as a guideline for analysing 
initiatives of private governance and certification.  
 
2. Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Palm oil is the world's second largest oil crop after soy oil. Over 28 million tons of palm oil 
are produced each year. The increasing demand results in pressures on the expansion to eco-
sensitive areas. The Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) was founded in Switzerland 
in 2004 as a result of an informal meeting initiated by the WWF two years earlier with Aarhus 
United UK Ltd, Golden Hope Plantations Berhad, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association, 
Sainsbury's and Unilever. The Statutes state that “RSPO's objectives are to promote the 
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growth and use of sustainable palm oil through co-operation within the supply chain and open 
dialogue with its stakeholders” (RSPO 2004a, p. 1). Members have agreed to fulfil eight core 
principles which are further divided into criteria and indicators (RSPO 2007): 
Principle 1: Commitment to transparency 
RSPO members must provide adequate information on environmental, social and legal issues 
relevant RSPO criteria (except where this is prevented by commercial confidentiality). 
Principle 2: Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
RSPO member have to comply with all applicable local, national and international legal 
provisions and regulations. The land rights of local communities with demonstrable [sic!] 
rights should not be contested. 
Principle 3: Commitment to long-term economic and financial viability 
A management plan that aims to achieve long-term economic and financial viability, and 
annual replanting programme, projected for a minimum of 5 years, with yearly review are 
required.  
Principle 4: Use of appropriate best practices by growers and millers 
Operating procedures are documented, implemented and monitored. Soil, water and 
biodiversity should be protected and where possible improved through management and 
monitoring plans, appropriate techniques and trained staff. Agrochemicals should be used 
according to standards set by the World Health Organisation and Stockholm and Rotterdam 
Conventions. 
Principle 5: Environmental responsibility and conservation of natural resources and 
biodiversity 
Aspects of plantation and mill management that have environmental impacts, including 
aspects of biodiversity, waste management, energy, fire use and greenhouse gas emissions, 
are assessed and monitored. Information should be collated that includes both the planted area 
itself and relevant wider landscape-level considerations. Where the identification of impacts 
requires changes in current practices in order to mitigate negative effects, timetables for 
change should be developed. 
Principle 6: Responsible consideration of employees and of individuals and communities 
affected by growers and mills 
Social impacts are identified in a participatory way, and plans to mitigate the negative impacts 
and promote the positive ones are made, implemented and monitored to demonstrate 
continuous improvement. Participation in this context requires affected parties being able to 
express their views. There are open and transparent methods for communication and 
consultation between growers and/or millers, local communities and other affected or 
interested parties. Documented systems are established for dealing with complaints and 
grievances and with compensation for loss of legal or customary rights. The employer 
respects the right of all personnel to form and join trade unions of their choice and to bargain 
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collectively. Children are not employed or exploited. Any form of discrimination based on 
race, caste, national origin, religion, disability, gender, sexual orientation, union membership, 
political affiliation, or age, is prohibited. 
Principle 7: Responsible development of new plantings 
A comprehensive and participatory independent social and environmental impact assessment 
on new plantings is undertaken, including soil surveys, topographic information and local 
peoples’ agreement and compensation. The results are incorporated into plans and operations. 
New plantings since November 2005, have not replaced primary forest or any area required to 
maintain or enhance one or more High Conservation Values. 
Principle 8: Commitment to continuous improvement in key areas of activity 
Growers and millers regularly monitor and review their activities and develop and implement 
action plans that allow demonstrable continuous improvement in key operations. 
In summary, the principles cover a wide range of issues. These are sometimes well specified, 
for instance, regarding employees’ rights and allowance of trade unions (principle 6). 
Sometimes they are only vague and displayable. The requirement of an annual replanting 
programme, for instance, does not imply any concrete replanting requirements (principle 3). 
When RSPO members oblige to fulfil the criteria, they basically commit their own particular 
activities in the field of palm oil to a comprehensive monitoring. In the following the 
legitimacy of the RSPO will be evaluated according to the conditions defined above (see table 
1).  
 
“De facto” Legitimacy 
The RSPO criteria define “sustainable” palm oil but are far from being consensus. Various 
approaches to evaluate the “sustainability” of biomass production exist and compete with 
each other (see Geibler 2007; Lewandowski/Faaij 2006). Civil society groups not 
participating in RSPO such as Friends of the Earth (FoE) groups and La Soja Mata warn that 
the criteria are flawed and not strict enough. For instance, FoE groups demand an abdication 
of the use of pesticides and other chemicals on “sustainable” plantations (FoE 2007b). They 
blame the palm oil industry for not being sustainable at all and pursuing deforestation and 
greenwash (FoE 2007b): If a plantation is on land cleared before 2005, it could be classed as 
sustainable by the RSPO, even if the manner in which the deforestation happened was illegal 
and created land rights conflicts. The same holds true for a company that pushes other 
farming activities (food or biofuel) into previously unfilled areas of forest (principle 7).  
When the RSPO presented proposals to label sustainable palm oil, FoE groups staged an 
installation of “screaming tree stumps outside the meeting in Brussels, representing the 
current environmental violations caused by producing palm oil” (FoE 2007b). 
However, there are also civil society groups in support of the RSPO, such as the WWF which 
started the initiative. RSPO is composed of ordinary members in seven different sectors: oil 
palm growers; palm oil processors and/or traders; consumer goods manufacturers; retailers; 
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banks and investors; environmental/nature conservation NGOs; social/developmental NGOs 
(RSPO 2004a). Non-membership or exit from the RSPO could bear high costs for anyone in 
the palm oil chain: If the RSPO certification system is successful, access to subsidies and 
even markets could be hampered for members of these groups being no RSPO members. For 
instance, the German government currently discusses the sustainability of admixed proportion 
of biofuels and, in this respect, an amendment of the renewable energy law: only certified 
palm oil should be inserted in future (BMU 2008). Thus constraints to join the RSPO exist 
while there is no general consensus on what makes palm oil production “sustainable”. Such 
consensus would however be essential for the condition of “de facto” legitimacy which can 
therefore not be considered as fulfilled. 
 
Legitimacy through Stakeholder Inclusion 
Any stakeholders or knowledge holders can request membership in the RSPO (RSPO 2004a, 
p. 2). The admission request must be addressed to the Executive Board. The Executive Board 
manages all activities. It is comprised of sixteen members and designated by the General 
Assembly which consists of all members (RSPO 2004a, p. 3). The Executive Board can reject 
any admission request without having to inform the candidate of the reasons motivating such 
decision (RSPO 2004a, p. 2). If accepted, members have to agree to a minimum duration of 
their membership for a two-year period and an annual fee of 2000 euros (RSPO 2004a, p. 1, 2, 
4). These conditions, of course, disadvantage and exclude small farmers and civil society 
actors, especially, from developing countries where incomes are low. Although the decisions 
within RSPO are taken either by consensus or at the majority of the votes of the ordinary 
members present (RSPO 2004a, p. 4), these conditions apply only to members, and some 
stakeholder are not involved or even oppose the RSPO such as FoE (FoE 2007a/b). 
Other NGOs and, in particular, WWF and Oxfam are very engaged members and, among 
other things, permanent members of the grievance panel. Yet, both have their headquarters in 
Switzerland and the U.K. respectively while no NGOs from the countries of production are on 
the grievance panel. Thus the RSPO is dominated by the private sector and actors from the 
North while conflicts exist between members and local actors from the countries of 
production. For instance, RSPO member Wilmar, the world’s largest producer of palm oil, is 
accused of systematic illegal burning of forests to clear land for plantations by Indonesian 
authorities (FoE 2007a). The company’s palm oil is however still certified as “sustainable”. 
This circumstance illustrates how the north-driven RSPO certification in practice contradicts 
local legislation and its enforcement in the South (in a way contradicting the RSPO own 
principles). In consequence, the RSPO cannot be considered legitimized through stakeholder 
inclusion. 
 
Legitimacy through Control and Accountability 
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Even though the RSPO could not win opponents to biofuel industry for participation, it 
established mechanisms of control and accountability within its structures. First, the General 
Assembly is able to retake unanimously any decision. Second, with the grievance panel the 
RSPO provides a platform – even for non-members – to address complaints against all RSPO 
members. “The purpose of the Grievance Panel is to preside and deliberate on grievances that 
are brought to RSPO and provided detailed recommendations for resolution that would be 
fine-tuned and adopted by one or both (or more) parties involved in any conflict” (RSPO 
2004b, p. 1). However, this process is neither involving state actors nor embedded in any legal 
system. There is hence neither conceptual guarantee nor empirical proof yet that the grievance 
system works in reality. Some non-state actors such as FoE groups (non-members) evaluate 
practices of RSPO member companies, and publish results. It is up to future developments, in 
how far these results will be taken into account, for example, in the allocation of subsidies. 
 
In summary, the RSPO relies on principles that are arrived at by consensus, at best, among its 
members. A general consensus on what “sustainable” palm oil is has not been established; i.e. 
“de facto” legitimacy is not possible. The members are mainly from the private sector and 
from the North while some civil society actors explicitly oppose the RSPO; i.e. no inclusion 
of all relevant stakeholder groups. Mechanisms for control and accountability exist, in 
particular, the grievance panel although we do not know yet how effectively it works and if 
practices of “unsustainable” palm oil production will be tracked and prevented. Overall, only 
the condition for legitimacy through control and accountability can be considered partly 
fulfilled.  
 
2. Cramer Commission 
While the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil has been initiated by non-state actors, the 
“Cramer Commission” (Project Group Sustainable Production of Biomass) was started by a 
group of six Dutch ministers that promote energy transition in the Netherlands and chaired by 
Jacqueline Cramer, the Dutch Environmental Minister. They invited a wide range of 
stakeholders to formulate criteria for sustainable biomass production and processing. The 
Commission’s results were planned to be used for the allocation of subsidies to biofuel 
industry (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 5). Targeting biomass flows in general, especially, 
non-food applicants their scope was much broader than the RSPO focus on palm oil. Also 
unlike the RSPO, the Commission’s assignment was limited to the period from January 2006 
until February 2007 (Cramer Commission 2007, p. 2). 
Criteria and indicators for the sustainable production of biomass were formulated and devised 
for two phases 2007-2010 and 2011-2020 (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 6-7). The criteria for 
2007 are minimum requirements which are supposed to be tested in three pilot projects 
(Cramer Commission 2006, p. 2, 6) while the criteria for 2011 and beyond prescribe active 
measures of protection. They were classified into six themes (Cramer Commission 
2006/2007): 
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1) Greenhouse gas balance: The minimum requirement is 30% emission reduction for 2007 
and 50% emission reduction for 2011 (and 70% emission reduction at the long run), compared 
with current fossil reference. 
2) Competition with food, local energy supply, medicines and building materials should be 
avoided or decreased through minimum requirements which are supposed to be generated by 
obligatory reporting from the period 2007-2010.  
3) Biodiversity: Plantations must not be located in or in the immediate vicinity of ‘gazetted 
protected areas’ (areas protected by the government) or areas of ‘High Conservation Value’. 
Again, minimum requirements are developed on the basis of obligatory reporting from the 
period 2007-2010. 
4) Economic prosperity: In cases where social and/or economic problems are to be expected 
by biomass production reporting is required according to the Economic Performance 
Indicators, as expressed in the Global Reporting Initiative (which is another multi-stakeholder 
institution). 
5) Social well-being: Compliance is required with the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Business Principles for Countering 
Bribery of the OECD. Obligatory reporting is required from 2007 on, and minimum 
requirements are planned for 2011. Active contributions are expected “in co-operation with 
the local community”. 
6) The Environment: Compliance is required with international conventions, EU regulations 
as well as local and national legislation and regulations on waste management, use of agro-
chemicals (including fertilizer), prevention of erosion and soil exhaustion and active 
improvement of the quality and quantity of surface and ground water. Reporting is required 
on erosion and soil exhaustion, and on quality and quantity of surface and ground water 
(2007-2011). For 2011, again, minimum requirements are planned on the basis of reporting. 
These criteria are formulated by the Cramer Commission to pave the way for a broader 
certification system for biomass production and processing such as the system run by the 
RSPO (limited to palm oil). The Commission, at first, envisages a certification based on track-
and-trace system in which the traceability of biomass is guaranteed (Cramer Commission 
2006, p. 18-19) but later preferences changed to a system of negotiable certificates (book and 
claim) as the latter could be introduced more rapidly (Cramer Commission 2007, p. 32-33). 
The aim is to certify “sustainable” biomass production around the world, and, potentially, to 
subsidise only certified biomass/biofuel. 
 
“De facto” Legitimacy 
The Cramer Commission is highly output oriented: “[I]t is of importance that the Dutch 
government together with other EU countries should take the initiative in the setting up of 
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national and/or worldwide monitoring programmes to be able to recognize negative effects [of 
biomass production and processing] in time” (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 23). A consensus 
on the formulated criteria to be minimum requirements is assumed not only among the project 
group “consisting of representatives of the private sector, social organizations, financial 
institutions and the government” (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 1) but, beyond, among all 
stakeholders and general society. 
On the one hand, the Cramer criteria are considered as non-binding advice or 
“recommendations” (Cramer Commission 2007, p. ii, iv). These formulations show that the 
Commission’s members were aware of their “private governance” status. On the other hand, 
the Dutch government plans to use these criteria for the allocation of subsidies and plans to 
take the lead in setting up national and/or worldwide programmes (Cramer Commission 2006, 
p. 4, 5). Thus, strong incentives exist for stakeholders to participate. Exit costs could be high 
for biofuel industry. However, the criteria formulated so far encompass only demands for 
reporting; there is no impact “on the ground” yet. “De facto” legitimacy can only be analysed 
to a limited extent. So far, as consensus on minimum requirements is only found among (non-
representative) members, the “de facto” legitimacy is not fulfilled (see table 1). 
 
Legitimacy through Stakeholder Inclusion 
The Cramer Commission encompasses a large number and variety of actors. State actors, in 
particular the Dutch ministers’ group, are in the driver’s seat. As an independent chairperson 
the Dutch environmental minister Jacqueline Cramer has directed the process. She invited 
other ministers and non-state actors from the private sector (biofuel industry, financial sector) 
and civil society to participate (Cramer Commission 2007, p. i). Which particular stakeholders 
have been involved and consulted is made transparent in reports published on the internet 
(Cramer Commission 2006, Appendix 4). As among state actors, there is also a Dutch bias 
among non-state actors. Special expert input was delivered by Dutch private consultancies 
(Ecofys, CE) and Utrecht University (Cramer Commission 2006, p. ii). Large multinational 
corporations such as Unilever, Shell and Exxon Mobile (Wilmar did not participate), and 
firms which specialize in biofuel business such as the BioX Group participated. On the part of 
civil society, the Dutch sections of Oxfam and WWF and even FoE participated among 
others. 
Different opinions between industry and civil society representatives have become evident in 
the Commission’s work. For instance, with respect to genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), three quarter of the NGOs argued for including this aspect while only a tenth of the 
companies did so (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 26). In general, NGOs advocated for a 
stricter framework than state actors and participants from the biofuel industry (Cramer 
Commission 2006, p. 27). However, the results were also accepted as minimum requirements 
by the Commission members from civil society. 
While interests between industry and NGOs were balanced within the Commission, this is not 
the case for the North-South divide. The Commission lacks members from the South although 
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the reach of the criteria developed is meant to be “universal” (Cramer Commission 2006, p. 
4). Thus, interests of people from the South as well as (business) interests from outside the 
field of biofuels are not represented in the Commission. Power asymmetries exist between 
those countries producing (developing and newly industrialised countries) and those countries 
mainly consuming (EU und US) the biomass and these asymmetries are not perpetuated but 
aggravated by the composition of the Cramer Commission (formulating criteria for worldwide 
production). Thus, on the one hand, the Cramer Commission (or the Dutch ministers) comes 
forward and, this way, jumps at the chance to overcome regulative deficits. On the other hand, 
this advancement goes past actors from “affected” producing countries. While civil society 
and business were represented in a balanced way, the Commission lacks participants from the 
South. Thus, the condition for legitimacy through inclusion of stakeholders is only partly 
fulfilled. 
 
Legitimacy through Control and Accountability 
The Cramer Commission repeatedly points to the fact that the proposed sustainability criteria 
must be integrated into political and policy frameworks at the national, European and global 
level (Cramer Commission 2006, p. iii). Such integration would allow for control and 
accountability. Meanwhile, the Commission itself is dominated by state actors from the Dutch 
government while no parliamentarians or state actors from the European or global level are 
involved. It can be argued that NGOs (and business) somehow take over the role of 
parliament as a counterpart to government within the Commission; i.e. there is a system of 
check and balances. However, the Dutch bias still causes a problem because the Dutch 
government can only be held accountable by the Dutch voters. Nevertheless, the 
Commission’s work is made very transparent and could theoretically be challenged by any 
organisation or country opposing it. 
 
In summary, the group of Dutch ministers made a concerted effort in appointing a 
Commission to formulate criteria that give way to a future worldwide certification system for 
the “sustainable” production and processing of biomass. A consensus was assumed on the 
formulated criteria to be minimum requirements. This “consensus” has not been established 
beyond the Commission, though. Thus the condition of “de facto” legitimacy cannot be 
fulfilled. However, conditions of legitimacy through stakeholders’ inclusion and through 
control and accountability are, at least, partly fulfilled: Civil society and business’ interests 
were represented equally although the Commission was dominated by Dutch actors. Besides 
no mechanisms for control and accountability have been established while, however, the 
Commission’s advance is made transparent and can be challenged by any “affected” actor. 
 
Table 1: Evaluation the legitimacy of Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and 
Cramer Commission 
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Private governance 
initiative/ 
Condition for legitimacy 
Roundtable on Sustainable 
Development  
Cramer Commission 
De facto legitimacy Not fulfilled: No consensus 
on “sustainable” palm oil 
production 
Not fulfilled: Consensus on 
minimum requirements only 
among members 
Legitimacy through 
stakeholders’ inclusion 
Not fulfilled: Dominance of 
private sector from the 
North; parts of civil society 
actors in explicit opposition 
Partly fulfilled: Balance of 
state, industry and civil 
society interests with 
Dutch/North bias 
Control and accountability Partly fulfilled: Grievance 
panel (without legal 
consequences) 
Partly fulfilled: Transparent 
recommendations 
 
Conclusion 
The biofuel industry has recently prompted protests from many groups through its increasing 
attempts to establish private governance regimes for regulation. The Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil and the Cramer Commission are initial responses to the negative effects 
of biofuel production. Both aim to set up a certification system, one for palm oil, one for 
biomass flows in general. The Cramer criteria are still at the stage of recommendations. It is 
not clear yet who is supposed to finance, prepare and monitor their realisation and which 
consequences would follow bad practice. In comparison, the RSPO system has already been 
established to a large extent: palm oil is already certified as “sustainable”. Not all negative 
effects are avoided by such certification, though.  
In regard to the legitimacy, we have seen that both private governance initiatives are highly 
output-oriented. “De facto” legitimacy assumes a consensus on what needs to be done, in case 
of biomass production, for example, ending rainforest clearance. There is no general 
consensus though on what makes biomass or palm oil production (and processing) 
sustainable. This is most obvious for GMOs: views are divided and both initiatives have not 
agreed on a position (support or ban) on the use of GMOs in “sustainable” farming. A further 
illustration is the case of RSPO certified plantations pushing other farming activities into 
previously unfilled areas of forest (leakage effect). Civil society criticizes that although in 
such cases a plantation indirectly causes further deforestation it can be certified as 
“sustainable” by the RSPO. As private governance by the biofuel industry cannot implement 
an unambiguously consensual output, none of the existing initiatives can be considered “de 
facto” legitimated. 
The RSPO principles, criteria and indicators were formulated in a benign manner by and 
towards biofuel industry, for example, excluding GMOs. The Cramer criteria are more 
Draft 16-04-2008, Lena Partzsch 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
concrete in some aspects, such as the requirement of 30% greenhouse gas emission reductions 
(while still at the stage of being tested though). Both initiatives fail to adequately include 
stakeholders’ participation from the affected producing countries. The Cramer Commission is 
very much state-driven while the RSPO was initiated by non-state actors and mostly 
encompasses the private sector. Moreover, the RSPO faces strong opposition from civil 
society groups which do not participate. Consequently the RSPO cannot and the Cramer 
Commission can only partly refer to legitimacy through stakeholder inclusion. 
In terms of control and accountability, the RSPO has distinctly assigned responsibility to its 
General Assembly and Executive Board and even set up an impressing grievance system. 
These institutions are however “private” in a sense that there is no legal suability (outsiders 
can turn to them but have no enforcement guarantee). The Cramer Commission’s legitimacy 
will still be challenged by practice when recommendations formulated so far turn into action. 
In any case, both initiatives made a remarkable advance in defining sustainability criteria. The 
fact that allocation of subsidies will depend on certification in the near future gives an idea of 
their agenda setting power. The certification systems’ impact will not be “private” anymore. 
Aspects of legitimacy should thus not be faded-out when referring to these agendas. 
Private governance in biofuel industry offers opportunities in terms recommendations from 
stakeholders. While there is no consensus on what makes biomass flows sustainable though, 
actors’ recommendation need to be considered as partial. A major challenge is to integrate 
actors from producing countries and adverse groups of civil society in order to balance 
interests. If the inclusion of actors from the South fails, private governance of global scope 
cannot be considered as legitimate as long as no general consensus has been established, in 
particular, as there is no guaranteed control and accountability. Private authority by the North 
is unlikely to be accepted by people in the South. Ongoing hunger protests around the world 
and demands for ban on producing biofuels indicate the inadmissibility. 
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